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THE FISCAL CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: DEFENDERS 
BUILDING ALLIANCES WITH FISCAL 
CONSERVATIVES 
Randolph N. Jonakait and Larry Eger1 
 
The national economic crisis provides a two-edged sword for 
public defenders and others concerned with the defense of indigents. 
The trend of slashing defender budgets that existed even before the 
recent economic downturn can be expected to continue. As Stephanie 
McAlister notes, “Indigent defense systems nationwide are 
chronically underfunded, forcing individual lawyers to carry 
excessive caseloads.”2 Many of these lawyers, operating in crisis 
mode, are “forced to provide inadequate defense due to underfunding 
and the subsequent excessive caseloads.”3 For example, “the 
Missouri State Public Defender system is overworked and 
underfunded. The office of the public defender faces a caseload 
crisis, caused in part by an ever-increasing number of prosecutions 
and a lack of commensurate increases in resources for the system.”4 
A committee established by the Missouri Senate in 2006 “found that 
six years had passed without the public defender’s office adding any 
staff, yet the system’s annual caseload totals rose by 12,000 cases.”5 
Sean O’Brien asks the following about the Missouri system: “What 
does a system on the brink look like? Low salaries cause high 
turnover, low morale, and recruitment difficulties. Some defenders 
work second jobs to pay student loans. Between 2001 and 2005, the 
cumulative turnover rate was nearly 100%.”6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Larry Eger is the Public Defender for Florida’s 12th Judicial District. Randolph N. Jonakait is a 
Professor at New York Law School. 
 2. Stephanie I. McAlister, Note, Between South Beach and a Hard Place: The 
Underfunding of the Miami-Dade Public Defender’s Office and the Resulting Ethical Double Standard, 
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1323 (2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Chris Dandurand, Note, Walking Out on the Check: How Missouri Abandoned Its Public 
Defenders and Left the Poor to Foot the Bill, 76 MO. L. REV. 185, 188 (2011). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Sean D. O’Brien, Missouri’s Public Defender Crisis: Shouldering the Burdens Alone, 75 MO. L. 
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Minnesota provides another example of a system confronting a 
crisis. “As a result of budget cuts and the simultaneous effect of 
increased case filings in Minnesota, the public defender workloads 
have increased, and the time spent by individual public defenders on 
cases has also decreased.”7 Minnesota budget cuts have led to large 
layoffs and unfilled vacancies.8 
Examples of budgetary problems for defenders abound. McAlister 
cites funding cutbacks in New York City and Kentucky and notes 
that “[a]s of November 2008, public defenders’ offices in seven 
states were refusing to take on new cases or had sued to limit them, 
on the grounds that excessive workloads made it impossible to fulfill 
their constitutional duties.”9 Florida, too, has been affected by limited 
funding. “The Sunshine State is not exempt from the growing 
nationwide indigent defense crisis. The problem in Florida is similar 
to the problems experienced across the country—too little money, too 
few attorneys, and too many defendants.”10 
The present economic crisis will only make this situation worse. 
What Judge Slieter writes about Minnesota applies to much, if not 
all, of the country. “[T]he economic slowdown has affected the 
public defense system as drastically as any part of government.”11 
Public defenders are facing a deepening crisis because of our 
governments’ financial difficulties. 
But these economic problems also present an unusual opportunity 
for reforming criminal justice. Some fiscal conservatives are 
                                                                                                                 
REV. 853, 866 (2010); see also Dandurand, supra note 4, at 186 (“New attorneys enter the practice with 
ever-increasing amounts of law school debt and see little incentive to endure the work load of the public 
defender system for any longer than it takes to find another job.”). 
 7. Judge Randall J. Slieter & Elizabeth M. Randa, The Minnesota Public Defender System: A 
Change of Governance Should Occur for the State to Effectively Fulfill Its Constitutional Obligation, 37 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 599, 610–11 (2011). 
 8. See William I. Bernard, Something’s Gotta Give: Minnesota Must Revise Its Procedure for 
Determining Eligibility for Appointment of Public Defenders, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 630, 644 
(2011) (“These 2008 vacancies equaled fifteen percent of the total number of public defenders 
statewide. . . . The Board of Public Defense’s anticipated loss of funding from 2009 caused the 
elimination of ninety-eight attorney positions or twenty percent of the attorney positions statewide.”). 
 9. McAlister, supra note 2, at 1323. 
 10. Id. at 1324. 
 11. Slieter & Randa, supra note 7, at 610; see also Bernard, supra note 8, at 631 (“Given the 
necessity to balance the state’s budget in these difficult economic times, increasing the funding for the 
Board of Public Defense, while desirable, does not appear to be possible.”). 
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beginning to realize that increased criminalization and lengthier 
sentences have led to huge increases in prison budgets without truly 
increasing society’s safety. Politicians and organizations that may not 
have been especially sympathetic to indigent defense in the past are 
reconsidering many “tough-on-crime” policies because of the harm 
they do to the economy. Concerned about state taxes and economic 
health, they are, or should be, concerned about the kinds of criminal 
justice reform that defenders can support. 
Thus, the financial crisis, while causing problems for defenders, 
also provides an opportunity for defenders to help bring about 
beneficial changes in criminal justice. Public defenders, with their 
firsthand experience, perhaps know better than anyone else aspects of 
the criminal justice system that have senselessly driven up state 
budgets without increasing public safety. Public defenders should 
identify and collect data about these policies and laws and present 
this information to the fiscal conservatives. Defenders should seek to 
support and expand the conservative reform efforts. And in states 
where fiscal conservatives have not been advocating reforms, 
defenders need to educate the public on how tough-on-crime policies 
are leading to unsustainable budgets. Florida provides an example of 
the possibilities. 
I. FISCAL CONSERVATIVES AND PRISON BUDGETS 
Florida TaxWatch, described by others as a “budget watchdog 
group that gets heavy support from business interests,”12 identifies 
itself as a “private, non-profit, non-partisan research institute [whose] 
mission is to provide . . . high quality, independent research and 
education on government revenues, expenditures, taxation, public 
policies and programs and to increase the productivity and 
accountability of Florida government.”13 TaxWatch has now taken 
positions on criminal justice that few, if any, fiscally conservative, 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Repeal of Mandatory Sentences Urged in Florida, GAINESVILLE.COM (Mar. 11, 2011, 1:41 PM), 
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20110311/WIRE/110319894. 
 13. About Florida TaxWatch, FLORIDATAXWATCH, http://www.floridataxwatch.org/aboutus (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
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pro-business groups were taking before the economic downturn. It 
has suggested a range of changes in Florida’s penal laws in order to 
reduce incarceration rates. The proposals may be driven solely by the 
recognition that spending money on Florida’s prisons is not 
sustainable for a healthy economy, but defense organizations, which 
may see additional reasons for reform, should seek to aid and expand 
the conservative recommendations. 
In its recent report, A Billion Dollars and Growing: Why Prison 
Bonding is Tougher on Florida’s Taxpayers Than on Crime, Florida 
TaxWatch charts the enormous growth in Florida’s prisons.14 “From 
1970 to 2010, Florida’s prison population increased from nearly 
8,800 to 102,000.”15 TaxWatch squelches any contention that this 
resulted merely from Florida’s larger populace. “The state’s 
population nearly tripled during that period, but that growth cannot 
explain the more than eleven-fold increase in the prison 
population.”16 Instead, Florida simply imprisons a greater percentage 
of Floridians. “The rate of incarceration . . . has jumped from .13 
percent to .54 percent. Forty years ago, the rate of incarceration was 
one quarter of what it is today.”17 
TaxWatch also dismisses any argument that a rise in crime 
explains the imprisonment surge: 
If population growth cannot account for the rapid increase 
in the prison population, the incidence of crime does not 
explain it either. . . . [W]hile the crime rate has fluctuated 
over time, there has been a general decline in index crimes 
since the late 1980’s while the prison population rate has 
                                                                                                                 
 14. COLLINS CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & FLORIDA TAXWATCH, A BILLION DOLLARS AND GROWING: 
WHY PRISON BONDING IS TOUGHER ON FLORIDA’S TAXPAYERS THAN ON CRIME (2011), available at 
http://www.floridataxwatch.org/resources/pdf/04062011ABillionDollarsGrowingWhyPrisonBondingTo
ugherFloridasTaxpayersThanCrime.pdf. 
 15. Id. at 4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 5 (quoting FLORIDA TAXWATCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
COST SAVINGS TASK FORCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011–12 (2010)). 
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increased dramatically.18 
Instead, TaxWatch maintains that the incarceration rate has soared 
because of pandering to the fear of crime. 
Florida, like many states, has made a series of purportedly 
‘tough on crime’ policy decisions over the past 20 years 
that have driven increases in incarceration . . . brought 
about by the public’s fear of crime and the corresponding 
desire of politicians to pander to those fears for the sake of 
not appearing to be “soft on crime.”19 
As a result, the operating costs of Florida prisons have soared. 
TaxWatch reports that from 1980 to 2010, operational spending on 
prisons has gone from $169 million (or about $447 million in 
inflation-adjusted dollars) to $2.4 billion.20 And as the report notes, 
this amount does not capture the capital expenditures necessary for 
the expansion of prison capacity, which puts burdens on future 
taxpayers because the construction costs, which until 1993 were 
financed from general funds on a pay-as-you-go basis, are now 
underwritten through bonds.21 TaxWatch concludes, 
Unfortunately for the taxpayers of Florida, by avoiding the 
hard but necessary choices required to change the criminal 
justice system, our state leaders have added more finance 
charges associated with the cost of prison construction on 
top of the enormous costs that are already associated with 
failing to properly address the problem of prison growth. 
Our political leaders are forfeiting our present and 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. at 4 (citing Understanding Florida’s UCR Data, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/685508bc-ce34-4423-b867-827ed0dc6fac/datahistory.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2012)). 
 19. Id. at 5. 
 20. COLLINS CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & FLORIDA TAXWATCH, supra note 14, at 2. 
 21. Id. at 3. 
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future . . . .22 
This business-oriented organization identifies many of the factors 
causing Florida’s unsustainable situation, which include 
the elimination of parole and the adoption of policies 
lengthening both sentences and the period of incarceration; 
widespread use of very short state prison sentences in lieu 
of community-based alternatives (e.g., jail, probation, 
treatment, electronic monitoring); and state prison 
incarceration for technical probation violations. 
Perhaps the most significant factor is the trend toward 
determinate, or “mandatory minimum,” 
sentencing . . . . Sentencing laws such as the “85 percent 
rule,” which mandates that inmates must serve 85 percent 
of their sentences before release, and other mandatory 
minimum policies . . . have combined to balloon the prison 
population and keep inmates there longer . . . .23 
The incarceration balloon needs deflating, and Florida TaxWatch 
finds a useful pin in Texas criminal justice reforms. Texas learned 
that its prisons were jammed with convicts who sensibly could have 
received alternative, less costly sentences. These include many 
imprisoned for drunken driving and drug offenses, “most of whom 
are non-violent or first-time offenders; and large numbers of mentally 
ill offenders who would be better served in community-based mental 
health facilities.”24 Texas expanded non-prison substance abuse, 
mental health, and diversion programs and enhanced the frequency of 
parole for low-risk prisoners.25 According to TaxWatch, this 
reinvestment strategy increased rehabilitation rates and “resulted in 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at 14. 
 23. Id. at 5. 
 24. Id. at 15. 
 25. COLLINS CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & FLORIDA TAXWATCH, supra note 14, at 15. 
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an immediate savings of $210.5 million for years 2008 and 2009, and 
decreased the state’s prison population by 1,257 in 2009.”26 
II. DEFENDERS SUPPORTING CONSERVATIVES 
At first blush, defenders might find it galling to support 
conservative reformers of criminal justice. Defenders have long seen 
firsthand the destructive, irresponsible effect of many tough-on-crime 
measures enacted by those proclaiming conservative principles. But 
what defenders need to remember is that they may have opposed 
many of those measures, and they still passed. Legislatures have been 
little swayed by defenders showing the senselessness of many of the 
last generation’s punitive measures. No matter what their motives, 
fiscal conservatives are more likely than defenders to get serious 
reform considerations from certain legislators, and consequently, 
defenders should take a supporting role to such conservatives. 
The starting point for reform may be to convince conservatives 
that they are still conservative even when supporting proposals to 
ameliorate tough-on-crime practices, and those conservatives are 
more likely to listen to fiscal conservatives than defenders on this 
point. Certainly Florida TaxWatch sees it as important to remove the 
liberal tar brush from those seeking to reform criminal justice. Thus, 
it desires to have “Florida join the ever-growing . . . range of criminal 
justice policy reforms led predominantly by conservatives who 
understand that highly punitive and incarceration-heavy penalties 
even for minor, non-violent crimes are unsustainable.”27 The 
organization goes on to say: 
Traditionally, criminal justice reform has been 
mischaracterized as reflecting “liberal” political leanings; 
however, the voices calling for smarter approaches now 
include prominent conservative policy-makers, activists, 
and commentators. [Leading c]onservatives . . . have 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2. 
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formed a partnership known as Right on Crime to serve as 
a clearinghouse for conservatives to lead the way in justice 
reform. As the group notes on its website: “Conservatives 
are known for being tough on crime, but we must also be 
tough on criminal justice spending. That means demanding 
more cost-effective approaches that enhance public 
safety.”28 
Whatever defenders may feel about this conservative conversion, 
they should seek to utilize it. If they are in a state where 
conservatives have not started to advocate criminal justice reform, 
defenders could, of course, directly make the case for reform, 
emphasizing the financial impact that tough-on-crime measures have 
wrought. Charting a state’s increased spending on prisons compared 
to spending on things such as education, roads, and police might be 
especially eye-catching, and data from states that have reduced 
budgets by lowering prison populations could be marshaled. But if 
politicians, worried about appearing soft on crime, have not listened 
to defenders in the past, they are unlikely to listen to defenders now. 
Instead, defenders should identify influential, fiscally conservative 
organizations that should be open to a pragmatic appeal for criminal 
justice reform, such as chambers of commerce and other business 
groups, and provide them with the data and arguments, especially 
from conservative groups, as to why it makes fiscal sense to have 
reform. Conservative spokespersons are more likely to convince 
politicians that, in seeking lower incarceration rates, they are not 
taking the electoral risk of appearing soft on crime. Instead, they are 
taking the hard-nosed, practical stance of saving tax dollars and 
advancing important business and other conservative goals. 
Although there are no doubt many things that might be circulated 
to get fiscal conservatives thinking about reform, a good starting 
point would be to disseminate the 2010 State of the Judiciary 
Address by Missouri Chief Justice William Ray Price, Jr.29 In a few 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 16. 
 29. WM. Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice Delivers 2010 State of the Judiciary Address, 66 J. MO. B. 68 
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pages, Chief Justice Price presents compelling, pragmatic reasons for 
changing criminal justice. He notes that while his state has enacted 
tough-on-crime measures, 
[w]hat we did not do was check to see how much it costs, 
or whether we were winning or losing. In fact, it has cost us 
billions of dollars and we have just as much crime now as 
we did when we started. . . . We may have been tough on 
crime, but we have not been smart on crime.30 
He especially advocates changes towards nonviolent offenders, 
who have been increasingly incarcerated at great costs with little gain 
for public safety.31 He stresses that this is not merely a Missouri 
problem and that it should not be a partisan issue. Quoting leaders 
from around the country, Price concludes, “Republicans and 
Democrats across the country are waking up.”32 
Chief Justice Price does make some general reform 
recommendations, but defenders could present to conservatives a 
more detailed list of possibilities that are accompanied with the fiscal 
impact of possible reforms. The recent detailed proposals of Florida 
TaxWatch could be used. While some of those proposals are Florida-
centric, the thirty pages of reform suggestions in Report and 
Recommendations of the Florida TaxWatch Government Cost 
Savings for Fiscal Year 2011–12 offers many concrete measures that 
should apply generally.33 Perhaps most important for convincing 
fiscal conservatives of the benefits of reform, the report frequently 
cites successful efforts in other states with the savings that actually 
resulted, and it gives realistic, projected budget decreases if such 
reforms were instituted in Florida. 
                                                                                                                 
(2010). 
 30. Id. at 69. 
 31. Id. at 70. 
 32. Id. 
 33. FLORIDA TAXWATCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA TAXWATCH 
GOVERNMENT COST SAVINGS TASK FORCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011–12 (2010), available at 
http://www.floridataxwatch.org/resources/pdf/12082010GCTSF.pdf. 
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III. CONSERVATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCING THE PRISON 
POPULATION 
TaxWatch finds essential the creation of a non-partisan 
commission to do a thorough review of a state’s criminal justice and 
corrections systems. This body should have representation from all 
branches of government and draw on expertise from many fields 
including “criminology, sentencing, corrections, veterans affairs, 
mental health, substance abuse, reentry and community 
supervision.”34 TaxWatch notes, “Virtually every state that has made 
the substantive policy changes that have succeeded in reducing the 
size of their corrections population has accomplished this through a 
bipartisan deliberative body engaging all three branches of 
government.”35 
TaxWatch also indicates that fiscal conservatives must change the 
last generation’s predominant philosophy that the primary purpose of 
sentencing is punishment. Florida has been “consistent with the trend 
across the U.S. that began in the late seventies with determinate 
sentencing, focusing on punishment (called ‘just deserts’), deterrence 
and incapacitation.”36 Sentencing then centers on the offenses, prior 
criminal history, and injury to the victim, but does not address public 
safety with a concern for recidivism. Instead, fiscal sense requires 
policies that increase public safety with the least cost. “[P]olicies and 
practices that address risk at the time of sentencing so that the 
sentence is most appropriate to the individual defendant’s risk of 
recidivating” must be used.37 Punishment for punishment’s sake has 
cost the taxpayers much and has not made society notably safer; 
reducing the rate at which convicted offenders commit future crimes 
not only can be cheaper, but also increases public safety. 
Specific reforms start with the recognition that the vast majority of 
the imprisoned have been sentenced for nonviolent offenses. 
TaxWatch reports that in fiscal year 2008–2009, “only 28.2 percent 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 45. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 48. 
 37. Id. 
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of the new admissions to prisons were incarcerated for violent 
crimes; the rest were admitted for drug, property or ‘other’ 
offenses.”38 This trend is not limited to Florida. For example, 
Missouri Chief Justice Price notes that the number of nonviolent 
offenders in Missouri prisons has almost doubled since 199439 and 
that the rise in the number of imprisoned nonviolent offenders 
explains much of the increase in corrections budgets. Chief Justice 
Price concludes that his state is now “spending $233.4 million a year 
to incarcerate nonviolent offenders . . . not counting the investment in 
the 10 prisons it takes to hold these individuals at $100 million per 
prison. In 1994, appropriations to the Department of Corrections 
totaled $216,753,472. Today, it’s $670,079,452.”40 And fiscal 
conservatives should see that this has not been money well spent. 
Chief Justice Price reports that “the recidivism rate for these 
individuals, who are returned to prison within just two years, is 41.6 
percent.”41 If a safer society is the goal, the increased corrections 
budget contains enormous government waste. 
TaxWatch suggests many possible reforms to reduce the 
incarceration rate of the nonviolent, including more non-state prison 
sentences, increasing the weights necessary for felony possession of 
marijuana and cocaine, updating the value thresholds for property 
felonies, and expanding the use of electronic monitoring. The report 
supports these reforms by projecting savings. For example, Florida 
prisons have 2,260 inmates incarcerated for mere possession of 
marijuana or cocaine, one-third of whom are first-time offenders.42 
“If half of the first-time offenders were diverted from prison, the state 
could save approximately $6.7 million, annually.”43 A study has 
shown that electronic monitoring reduces the likelihood of 
recidivism. If such monitoring was used for the last 20% of half the 
prisoners’ sentences, the state could save $5.7 million.44 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. at 50. 
 39. Price, supra note 29, at 70. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. TaxWatch, supra note 33, at 54. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 56. 
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Better drug treatment can reduce incarceration and recidivism, the 
TaxWatch report notes. About 60% of all Florida arrests are either 
committed under the influence of drugs or alcohol or in pursuit of 
drugs or alcohol.45 Florida has in-prison drug programs, but they do 
not serve all those who should be treated. “Significant savings could 
be achieved if certain offenders were allowed to receive treatment 
outside of the confines of prison during the last portion of their prison 
sentence, and research shows that programs in the community 
produce twice the impact on recidivism as the same program behind 
the walls.”46 
Florida has abolished parole and requires prisoners to serve at least 
85% of their sentences.47 Even relatively minor changes in this 
requirement can bring great savings. If nonviolent inmates were 
released after serving 80% of their sentences, more than $13 million 
could be saved annually.48 
With increased sentence lengths and the abolition of parole has 
come an aging prison population. Although “the literature shows that 
most offenders age out of their crime-committing years,” nationally 
10% of the prison population is over forty-nine.49 It is even higher in 
Florida, and the rate is increasing. It was 5.7% in 1996, 8.0% in 
2000, and 16.1% in 2010.50 The costs of incarcerating the elderly are 
estimated to be three times that of incarcerating younger prisoners, 
primarily because of increased medical costs.51 If elderly prisoners 
not convicted of capital murder were paroled after serving twenty 
years, Florida could save $2.6 million a year.52 
Fiscal conservatives, as indicated by TaxWatch, also have realized 
that more than a reduction in the incarceration rate is needed. 
Inmates, no matter the length of their sentences, must be better 
prepared for a post-prison life. Investment in programs that cut 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. at 58. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 34. 
 48. TaxWatch, supra note 33, at 60. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 61. 
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recidivism not only pays for itself by reducing future imprisonments, 
but it also contributes to a safer society. In spite of attempts at 
reducing Florida recidivism, “about one-third of inmates nevertheless 
do come back within three years of release. Florida has not focused 
sufficient resources in preparing them during their previous stints in 
prison to succeed upon being released.”53 Among other things, 
TaxWatch advocates expansion of substance abuse and mental health 
treatment, as well as literacy, education, vocational, and life-
management training. Ultimately, “[g]ainful employment is essential 
to any strategy to reduce recidivism, and thus to reduce crime and 
make communities safer.”54 Florida, however, like other states, has 
enacted “a vast, bewildering and unwieldy patchwork of hundreds of 
state-created restrictions” on the employment of convicts.55 “For 
employers, it’s a minefield. Hiring in violation of the restrictions can 
lead to a loss of a business license and other harsh penalties.”56 The 
state needs a thorough review and reform of these restrictions in 
order to reduce recidivism. 
IV. THE REFORM ROLES FOR DEFENDERS 
In states where fiscal watchdogs have not begun a fundamental 
rethinking of the criminal justice system, defenders should be trying 
to convince conservative leaders and organizations that rising prison 
costs are unsustainable and can be safely reduced through the kinds 
of reforms Florida TaxWatch proposes. In states where fiscal 
conservatives have already begun to advocate for change, the role of 
the defenders should be different. Although defenders might be 
sorely tempted to point out that many conservatives in the past took 
tough-on-crime positions without any cost-benefit analyses, helping 
to cause the present crisis, pragmatism dictates resisting this 
temptation. If conservatives are advocating reform, no matter what 
their reasons and their past positions, defenders should now aid them, 
                                                                                                                 
 53. TaxWatch, supra note 33, at 63. 
 54. Id. at 66. 
 55. Id. at 67. 
 56. Id. at 67. 
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and the alliance will not be helped by dredging up previous, 
inconsistent positions. The political realities are that these fiscal 
conservatives are more likely to be effective in reforming the system 
than defenders, and consequently defenders should be content to 
place themselves in a supporting role on the issues that those 
conservatives have identified. 
Defenders, however, should take additional steps. Their everyday 
experience with those affected by the tough-on-crime policies gives 
defenders extensive expertise concerning the waste and costliness of 
many penal laws and practices that those outside the criminal justice 
system are unlikely to have. Defenders should be identifying 
additional reforms that could attract fiscal conservatives, marshaling 
data about them, and presenting this information to the conservatives 
spearheading reform efforts. For example, in Florida incarceration 
rates could be sensibly decreased if convictions for nonviolent 
second-degree felonies, such as dealing in stolen property or the sale 
of small amounts of drugs, did not require state prison sentences; if 
possession of burglary tools was made a misdemeanor; and if the 
opiate trafficking statutes were based on the actual weight of the 
drugs and not mixtures containing them. 
V. THE REEXAMINATION OF PENALTIES FOR SOME SPECIFIC CRIMES 
Defenders have also seen that the last generation’s tough-on-crime 
policies have wastefully increased penalties and conditions for some 
specific crimes. This has often been the result when the impetus for 
legislative action has been some well-publicized, violent incident. 
The resulting legislation often goes well beyond the triggering crime 
and applies to many nonviolent offenders who pose no real 
continuing threat to community safety. Such laws may not 
meaningfully increase societal security, may make recidivism more 
likely, and usually are enacted with little consideration of costs. 
Fiscal conservatives should be concerned about such laws. 
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A. Sex Offender Registration and Related Laws 
Prime examples are the special conditions imposed on sexual 
offenders after the completion of sentences. All states require 
convicted sex offenders to register home addresses with local 
officials, often for a lifetime. All the states require community 
notification of such registrations. Many communities and states place 
restrictions on where the convicted sex offenders can live or work.57 
Such laws have often been passed in a misleading way. A study of 
the debates leading to federal laws concerning sexual offenders 
indicates the pattern. Supporters cited horrific, well-publicized 
examples of crimes committed on children and maintained that the 
laws were necessary for protection against similar acts, but the laws 
were not limited to those who have victimized children.58 
The registration, notification, and residence requirements do little 
to affect public safety because they are based on the myth that 
children primarily have to be protected from strangers. The rationale 
is that if we can keep tabs on those strangers and limit their access to 
where children congregate, safety will be significantly improved. The 
primary danger, however, does not come on the streets or at bus stops 
or in schools, but from within the home. “The vast majority of child 
molestation offenses are committed by non-strangers. Offenses by 
strangers account for only seven percent of all cases of child sex 
abuse.”59 Even so, the study of the federal debates found no supporter 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Amber Leigh Bagley, “An Era of Human Zoning”: Banishing Sex Offenders from 
Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J. 1347, 1348–49 (2008) (“[A]ll 
fifty states and the District of Columbia require convicted sex offenders to register their home addresses 
with local officials. Some offenders must register for a number of years, others for the duration of their 
lives. All fifty states have also enacted legislation requiring community notification of a sex offender’s 
presence. . . . [S]ome states and cities have gone even further, requiring sex offenders to reside outside 
restricted zones. . . . [T]he most recent zoning restrictions reach residential and employment 
options . . . .”); see also Meredith Cohen, Notes and Comments, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to 
Combat Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 741 (2008) 
(“Approximately 400 municipalities across the country have enacted local zoning ordinances restricting 
where sex offenders can live.”). 
 58. See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 
IND. L.J. 315, 355 (2001) (“[The] debates framed Megan’s Law almost entirely in terms of child 
protection. This was expected given the name of the bill, but it did not accurately reflect the true scope 
of Megan’s Law [which was not] limited only to offenders who victimize children. Legislators’ decision 
to frame the debate in such limited terms must, therefore, be seen as a conscious rhetorical tactic.”). 
 59. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. 
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making a distinction between familial and non-familial abuse,60 and 
the laws do little to affect the rate of abuse by family members and 
acquaintances. 
The laws are overbroad even for addressing the “stranger danger.” 
The registration, notification, and residency laws are not limited to 
rapists and child molesters. They often include flashers, voyeurs, 
prostitutes, possessors of child pornography, those in adult incest 
relationships, and those who have committed bestiality.61 The person 
who urinates in an alleyway may be convicted of public indecency, 
and this can make him a sexual offender and subjected to registration 
and residency restrictions.62 Twenty-nine states require registration as 
sex offenders for those engaging in consensual teenage sex.63 The 
laws often treat the included sex offenders as a homogeneous group 
when they actually present greatly differing public dangers and 
risks.64 The eighteen-year-old convicted of having consensual sexual 
                                                                                                                 
L. REV. 853, 887 (2011); see also Bagley, supra note 45, at 1378 (“[T]he most likely sexual threat to a 
child is an adult that the child knows well: in ninety percent of child molestation cases, the offender is 
either a family member or acquaintance of the child.”); cf. Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging 
Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 435, 453 (2010) (“Perhaps the most 
prominent myth concerning sex offenders is the concept of ‘stranger danger.’”). 
 60. See Filler, supra note 54, at 332 (“Every congressional story told in support of Megan’s Law 
featured a child victim who suffered serious abuse. Legislators did not tell any stories involving 
arguably less disturbing offenses like consensual sex with minors or possession of child pornography, 
both of which fell within the ambit of Megan’s Law. More importantly, legislators eschewed accounts 
featuring adult victims. They focused only on vivid, dramatic, and undeniable cases of child 
victimization.”); see also id. at 338 (“Not a single Megan’s Law supporter [in the federal debates] cited 
data that distinguished familial and nonfamilial abuse.”); Michael Vitello, Punishing Sex Offenders: 
When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 667 (2008) (“[A]bductions and murders[ that] 
command the public’s attention, . . . although statistical aberrations, have driven America’s policies for 
dealing with sexual offenders for over a decade.”).  
 61. See Yung, supra note 55, at 455 (observing that, while rapists, child molesters, and child 
pornographers have to register, “many other crimes are substantially represented on sex offender 
registries, including flashers, gropers, voyeurs, prostitutes, persons who have engaged in adult incest 
relationships, stalkers, and those who have committed bestiality”). 
 62. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 53, at 1388 (“[S]ex offender registration laws have [led] to the 
regulation of people who are not particularly frightening, such as people convicted of indecent exposure 
for urinating in public.”); see also Yung, supra note 55, at 456 (“In many states, public urination is 
prosecuted as public indecency, meaning that those persons so convicted are categorized with 
flashers.”). 
 63. Cohen, supra note 53, at 738 (“Currently, at least twenty-nine states require individuals to 
register as sex offenders for engaging in consensual teenage sex.”). 
 64. Yung, supra note 58, at 455 (“Sex offenders are treated as a uniform population even though 
they are an incredibly diverse group representing different dangers and risk levels.”); see also Vitello, 
supra note 59, at 676 (“[L]egislatures have created broad statutory protections based on an incorrect 
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intercourse with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend surely poses a 
different societal risk from the child rapist and even the one-time 
flasher, but all may face the same registration and residency 
restriction requirements. “There are many persons who are branded 
sex offenders who have committed crimes that cannot possibly 
justify the punishments and restrictions to which they are 
subjected.”65 
No public safety gain has been shown from the registration, 
notification, and zoning requirements. Studies have found that 
registration laws have “reduced neither the number of re-arrests for 
sex offenses nor the proportion of child molestation or incest as 
compared to other sex offenses. Nor [have the laws] reduced the 
number of victims.”66 This is not surprising since the laws are aimed 
at strangers. 
[E]ven if policies aimed at stranger offenses were 
successful, because strangers make up such a small 
percentage of child sex offenses, reducing the rate of 
contact offenses by strangers is likely to have a smaller 
effect on the overall number of child sex abuse crimes than 
a measure aimed at intrafamily or other non-stranger 
offenders.67 
On the other hand, these additional, often lifelong consequences to 
sex offense convictions may make it less likely that family and 
                                                                                                                 
view of sexual offenders as a homogeneous group.”). 
 65. Yung, supra note 55, at 476; see also Vitello, supra note 56, at 670–71 (“[Registration is 
required for] a variety of crimes where the conduct falls far short of the predatory conduct that gave rise 
to the registration requirements. For example, included are crimes like sexual battery, a variety of 
offenses dealing with underage sexual partners even if the conduct is factually consensual, and 
possession of child pornography, all of which present risks far different from those giving rise to the 
registration laws.”). 
 66. Hessick, supra note 55, at 889; see also Cohen, supra note 53, at 740 (no convincing evidence of 
public safety gains from registration and notification laws). 
 67. Hessick, supra note 55, at 889–90; see also Bagley, supra note 53, at 1377 (“Zoning restrictions 
fail to protect children from sexual threats . . . [because] these restrictions focus on strangers who have 
been convicted of sex offenses, but strangers are the least likely individuals to sexually assault 
children.”). 
17
Jonakait and Eger: The Fiscal Crisis as an Opportunity for Criminal Justice Reform:
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1176 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
juvenile offenders are reported.68 After New Jersey imposed 
community notification requirements, it had a decrease in incest 
reports.69 The notifications, besides placing a permanent burden on 
the offender, can often, in effect, tell the community that the 
offender’s child or stepchild was the victim, and many victims and 
their parents may wish to keep that information private.70 
While adding little to public safety, the registration, notification, 
and residency restrictions can greatly burden the offenders. They 
make it harder to get jobs and education. They make it difficult to 
find housing, and offenders may have to move out of their 
communities, causing increased homelessness.71 What Professor 
Corey Rayburn Yung says about one offense applies to many: 
A person convicted of a single count of public indecency 
might be subject to a lifetime of extensive registration 
requirements that carry hefty prison terms for a single 
violation. The information required in the registry, 
including the offender’s residential address, email address, 
and phone number, will be listed on a publicly available 
database for anyone to view. The convict might be subject 
to residency restrictions such that he or she can no longer 
live in large portions of the state in which he or she resides. 
This can result in physical separation from family 
(including a spouse) and the only friends that the offender 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 53, at 1379 (“[T]he threat of these restrictions is likely to decrease 
the reports of sexual assault by children’s primary threat—family members and friends.”); see also 
Vitello, supra note 56, at 685 (“Even if they report the crime, they may lose the will to cooperate with 
the police when they discover the severity of punishment that their family member may face. While 
family members may favor some state intervention, bringing the full force of current sexual offender 
statutes to bear may lead the family to lose their nerve.”). 
 69. See Bagley, supra note 53, at 1384 (“This close association between offender and victim has led 
to decreased reporting of abuse within families.”). 
 70. Id. (“Incest victims fear reporting incest because the combination of registration and notification 
exposes the victim—who shares the offender’s home—to the effects of the regulation.”). 
 71. See Bagley, supra note 53, at 1361 (“Homelessness is a likely result of being cast out of the 
community where one lives and works. For a less-skilled individual, or for an individual with highly 
specialized skills, finding employment within his new community may take time.”); see also Vitello, 
supra note 56, at 681 (noting that reporting and residency requirements can cause homelessness). 
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might have ever known.72 
The laws make it harder for the offender who has completed a 
sentence to integrate back into the community, and that lack of 
integration may actually increase recidivism.73 The laws may be 
actually making society less safe. 
Like many tough-on-crime measures, the registration, notification, 
and residency restriction laws have been passed without 
consideration of their monetary costs.74 Defenders, however, need to 
stress to fiscal conservatives that the laws, while accomplishing little 
positively, affect public budgets. Every time law enforcement 
officers check a registrant’s address, money, in effect, is being 
spent.75 The registration laws have caused the hiring of extra law 
enforcement agents.76 Perhaps the strongest indication of the 
significant costs comes as a result of a federal law that seeks to have 
states impose registration and other requirements on sexual 
offenders. “The penalty for noncompliance for any fiscal year is that 
a state will lose 10% of funds authorized under the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act . . . . Interestingly, every state that has 
studied the costs of compliance has determined that noncompliance is 
substantially cheaper.”77 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Yung, supra note 55, at 473. 
 73. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 53, at 1381 (noting that, because recidivism is lowered when an 
offender can make a successful transition into the community, “ironically, one of the major results of the 
zoning schemes may be an increased rate of recidivism for sex offenders. . . . By making community 
living difficult for sex offenders, zoning schemes deny registered sex offenders the opportunity to 
successfully reenter society and lead productive lives”). 
 74. See Filler, supra note 54, at 361 (observing that legislators eschewed “the dull, nuts-and-bolts 
issues, and [avoided] complicated [issues] relating to the efficiency and costs of Megan’s Law”); see 
also id. at 363 (noting that supporters “did not address the potentially significant economic costs of the 
bill”). 
 75. See Bagley, supra note 53, at 1388–89 (“[O]verinclusive registration laws waste police officers’ 
time. For every hour an officer spends checking a flasher’s address to ensure he lives there, that officer 
is not checking on pedophiles, rapists, and other sexual predators.”). 
 76. See Yung, supra note 55, at 447 (“A recent appropriations bill allocated funds to hire 150 deputy 
U.S. Marshals who will be solely dedicated to enforcing the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act . . . .”). 
 77. Yung, supra note 55, at 479. 
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B. Child Pornography Laws 
The last generation’s tough-on-crime stance has also driven up 
corrections budgets by its reaction to child pornography. As Carissa 
Byrne Hessick notes in a recent, excellent article, “The legislative 
response to the modern increase in child pornography has been 
uniformly draconian. State and federal governments have drastically 
increased the criminal penalties for possession of child 
pornography.”78 Since 2000, a majority of the states have raised the 
sentences for the crime. Some have made the maximums twenty 
times longer than before or even authorized life imprisonment.79 
Sentences can be extremely lengthy when each image possessed, 
usually amassed from the Internet with little effort, is treated as a 
separate count that results in consecutive sentences.80 Many places 
punish mere possession as harshly as the production, manufacture, or 
distribution of the pornography,81 and courts have imposed longer 
sentences for those convicted of possession of pornography than on 
those convicted of molesting and sexually assaulting children.82 
If the true goal of criminal justice is the fiscally conservative one 
of increased public safety, then the draconian penalties for possession 
of child pornography should correlate to a decrease in child abuse. 
After reviewing the data, however, Hessick concludes that there is a 
“lack of empirical support for a link between possession of child 
pornography and child sex abuse.”83 This is hardly surprising, once 
again, because the rationale for the harsh sentences sees child abuse 
coming from strangers, when that is seldom the case. In fact, the 
lengthy sentences do little, if anything, to make our children safer, 
but they do add to corrections budgets, and defenders should be 
presenting these facts to fiscal conservatives. 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Hessick, supra note 55, at 855. 
 79. See id. at 860. 
 80. See id. at 861–62 (“Treating each image as a separate offense can result in extremely long 
sentences, especially because the Internet allows individuals to amass a significant number of images 
with little effort.”). 
 81. See id. at 864. 
 82. See id. at 863. 
 83. Id. at 900. 
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VI. REDUCING PRETRIAL INCARCERATION 
Groups such as Florida TaxWatch have focused on state 
corrections budgets, and the resulting reform proposals center on the 
treatment of felony convictions. Pretrial incarcerations, however, also 
cost taxpayers, and defenders should seek to educate fiscal 
conservatives about those public expenditures and suggest reforms 
that could reduce them. Needless financial burdens are placed on 
taxpayers by detaining those who are not a danger and who would 
appear for court dates if released. Investment in correctly identifying 
such defendants can save the system money. Appointing lawyers 
earlier in the process than is now done in many places can be a cost-
effective way to reduce the number of needless detentions. 
Douglas I. Colbert notes, “In most state and local courts, legal 
representation of the poor does not commence at the crucial bail 
stage.”84 Usually these initial judicial pretrial release hearings “are 
perfunctory”: 
They move swiftly, aided by video jail broadcasts, which 
make it unnecessary even to transport arrestees to the local 
courtroom. In many jurisdictions, a prosecuting attorney is 
present and recommends bail, thus stacking the odds even 
more against an accused. Under these circumstances, many 
defendants choose to remain silent . . . . [T]he outcome is 
typically adverse: absent an advocate to provide verified 
information about an accused’s reliable ties to the 
community, most judges maintain or set bail conditions 
beyond what the individual can afford.85 
Concerned about this situation, Colbert and others set up a pilot 
program in Baltimore. Legal representatives were randomly assigned 
before the first judicial bail hearing to a portion of the pool of those 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Douglas I. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the 
Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2002). 
 85. Id. at 1726–27. 
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arrested for nonviolent crimes. The initial bail set by a bail 
commissioner was nearly identical for the represented and 
nonrepresented groups, but at the judicial review of that bail, 
represented defendants were more than four times as likely to have 
their bail reduced than were the nonrepresented, and the represented 
were significantly more likely to be released on their own 
recognizance.86 More of the represented group gained release from 
pretrial detention and gained release more quickly than those who 
were not represented. These outcomes were not the results of 
lawyerly tricks, obfuscations, or obstruction; instead, lawyers made 
sure that the court had more complete, relevant knowledge for the 
bail decision. The lawyer acted as an 
information provider to the court. A lawyer would be 
expected to investigate the suspect’s circumstances and 
prior history and provide information to the court about 
their community ties, financial hardships, and prior 
experiences with arrests, convictions, and court 
appearances. An attorney would, therefore, have the 
requisite knowledge to correct any mistaken data about the 
suspect or her case that the court might receive from other 
sources (for example, from the prosecutor or pretrial 
services).87 
While defenders may see many advantages for effective 
representation by the appointment of counsel as early as possible,88 
defenders should be emphasizing that appointment before the first 
judicial bail hearing can reduce the overall costs of criminal justice. 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 1753, 1755. 
 87. Id. at 1743–44. 
 88. See id. at 1727 (“[D]enying counsel to an accused indigent during the crucial period following 
arrest has disastrous consequences on the legal system’s ability to render fair and just verdicts. This is 
the period lawyers recognize as ‘most critical’ for conducting a ‘thoroughgoing investigation’ and 
evaluation of the State’s evidence. Delaying a lawyer’s immediate entry often translates into prosecuting 
witnesses becoming unavailable or unwilling to speak to defense counsel and severely impedes the 
preparation of a meaningful defense. By the time counsel enters the ongoing proceeding, too much 
valuable time has been lost. The typical detainee is left with little hope of receiving adequate and 
effective legal assistance.”). 
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The authors of the Baltimore study concluded that “for every person 
given a lawyer at the bail hearing, we expect to save about 10 bed 
days overall” of pretrial detention.89 Since about 90% of the cases 
entering the criminal justice system are for nonviolent, low-level 
offenses, reducing needless pretrial detentions by only a week on 
average can produce significant cumulative savings. In jurisdictions 
where defenders are not appointed until after the initial judicial bail 
review, the defenders should be making the case to conservatives for 
pilot programs for the earlier appointment of counsel so that the 
increased costs for attorneys can be measured against the savings that 
result from any lesser pretrial detention that results. 
VII. EXAMINING PROMISED SAVINGS FROM ADOPTED REFORMS 
Defenders should also be urging fiscal conservatives to analyze 
whether some instituted criminal justice innovations have delivered 
the promised savings. In one such reform, instead of bringing 
detainees to court for an initial bail decision, the detainees appear 
before a camera and a microphone in the jail with the image and 
sound piped into the courtroom where the bail decision is made. Such 
videoconferencing, which promises reduced costs, has been widely 
adopted.90 “[T]heir adoption is fueled by the attractions of 
convenience and the reduction of transportation and other costs 
associated with live proceedings.”91 The assumption is that a video 
system brings efficiencies without disadvantaging detainees.92 
A major study, however, casts doubt upon those rationales for 
videoconferencing. That study examined the use of videos for bail 
decisions in Cook County, Illinois.93 While Cook County maintained 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 1757. 
 90. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings 
on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 869, 878 (2010). By 2002, the majority of the states 
allowed some types of criminal proceedings to be held by videoconferencing. Id. 
 91. Id. at 877. In addition, “[v]ideoconferenced hearings also have the benefit of reducing safety 
concerns when prisoners or potentially volatile mentally disturbed individuals are involved, because 
transporting those individuals to court for a live hearing may pose a security risk.” Id. 
 92. See id. at 869. 
 93. Id. at 870. 
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live bail decisions for murder, manslaughter, and sexual assault 
cases, it instituted a video system for the initial bail determination for 
all other felonies. The study examined the bail hearings for a period 
of more than eight years preceding the institution of the 
videoconferencing and eight years afterwards. The study found that 
the video hearings had led to an increase in the size of the bail. The 
average bond amount set in the televised proceedings was 51% 
higher compared to when the bail hearings were live, while the bond 
for the felonies that continued to get a live hearing increased an 
insignificant 13% during the same time period.94 
Those who conducted the study cannot definitively say why 
videoconferencing made bail decisions more severe, but they note 
that other studies have indicated that “there may be some aspects of 
live presence that affect the believability of an individual.”95 They go 
on to state: 
If there is something about the presence of a live individual 
that cannot be replicated even with modern technology, 
then videoconferenced bail hearings cannot avoid a 
sacrifice of information that may threaten the quality of bail 
decisions, and a dehumanization that encourages a harsher 
response than would occur if the judge were faced with a 
live individual.96 
The point to stress to fiscal conservatives, however, is that a 
program to save money may be actually increasing the burden on 
taxpayers. Increased bails mean more people detained, and that 
means higher costs. The study makes this important point: 
Ironically, an overeager welcome of technology can impose 
costs of its own. By boosting bond levels and decreasing 
the ability of defendants to obtain release pending trial, 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See id. at 892–96. 
 95. Id. at 900. 
 96. Diamond et al., supra note 84, at 900. 
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videoconferenced bail hearings may actually impose 
financial costs on the justice system by leading to pretrial 
incarcerations of defendants who would be otherwise 
released.97 
This does not mean that innovations that could lead to cost savings 
without disadvantaging defendants should not be sought. On the 
other hand, no matter how compelling the logic might seem for a 
change, a criminal justice system should not simply leap into a 
wholesale change. As with the videoconferencing, there might be 
unforeseen, costly consequences. “The needed approach is to conduct 
pilot programs that include an evaluation of the operation and impact 
of proposed reforms, rather than simply to impose dramatic system-
wide changes, as Cook County did with the videoconferencing bail 
‘reform.’”98 
VIII. SAVINGS FROM FRONTLOADING THE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM 
Defenders should also point out to fiscal conservatives how 
shifting resources for the earlier adjudication of minor offenses can 
save the criminal justice system money. In many jurisdictions, after 
bail is set, the case is adjourned for ten days to a month or even forty-
five days.99 At this next court appearance, however, many of those 
who have been in pretrial incarceration are released from custody for 
a number of reasons. Often the cases are not prosecuted. In 
Baltimore, for example, “[m]ore than two out of three District Court 
cases are ultimately dismissed or placed on the inactive calendar.”100 
In addition, as many defenders know, a significant number of low-
level offenders plead guilty at their first appearance after the bail 
setting and are placed on probation or put into diversion programs or 
receive some other sort of disposition that releases those detained. 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. at 901. 
 98. Id. at 902. 
 99. See Colbert et al., supra note 79, at 1722, 1727. 
 100. Id. at 1721–22. 
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As a result, many jailed for low-level offenses gain release from 
pretrial incarceration at their first appearance after the bail-setting. 
Jurisdictions that postpone all low-level cases for two or three weeks 
or more after the initial bail hearing are wasting money. If instead, 
the next court appearance for at least the detained defendants were 
held sooner, the pretrial incarceration rate, along with its costs, would 
decrease. If fiscal conservatives are seeking to cut the needless costs 
in criminal justice, the focus should not just be on the needlessly 
lengthy incarcerations of those charged with serious felonies. In 
addition, the criminal justice community should focus on the front 
end of the process, where most defendants face minor charges: 
Immediate decisions would be made to dismiss, to refrain 
from prosecution, or to offer diversion after arrest. At a 
time when many jurisdictions are seeing an increase in 
misdemeanor arrests because of “no tolerance police 
practices” and an increase in local pretrial jail populations, 
[more resources earlier in the process can reduce] the costs 
of overburdened jail and court systems . . . .101 
IX. REEXAMINE THE DEATH PENALTY 
Defenders should also be supplying fiscal conservatives with 
reasons for a reexamination of the death penalty. When a life-
without-parole sentence is the alternative, the death penalty, of 
course, does nothing to enhance general public safety through 
reducing recidivism. Only if the death penalty acts as a deterrent to 
others can it make society safer. Support, however, for its deterrent 
effect is weak and contradictory. In an excellent review of the data, 
John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers note that homicide rates in states 
with and without the death penalty tend to rise and fall together, and 
this has been true even when U.S. Supreme Court decisions imposed 
a moratorium everywhere on capital punishment.102 This data 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. at 1721. 
 102. John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Use and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty 
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indicates that any possible effect the death penalty has on murder is 
small because “most of the variation in homicide rates is driven by 
factors that are common to both death penalty and non-death penalty 
states.”103 
While any possible deterrent effect of the death penalty must be 
minor, it is almost impossible to find because it is “difficult . . . to 
isolate any causal effects with confidence.”104 Indeed, while some 
data suggests a deterrent effect, that data simultaneously suggests that 
the death penalty could actually be associated with an increase in 
homicide rates.105 The authors reviewing the data conclude 
that the existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly 
fragile . . . . Our estimates suggest not just “reasonable 
doubt” about whether there is any deterrent effect of the 
death penalty, but profound uncertainty. We are confident 
that the effects are not large, but we remain unsure even of 
whether they are positive or negative.106 
Donohue and Wolfers are hardly alone in this assessment. The 
Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) commissioned a survey of 
police chiefs, and even a majority of this group did not believe that 
the death penalty reduced homicides.107 The DPIC goes on to state: 
A recent survey showed that 88% of the country’s top 
criminologists do not believe the death penalty acts as a 
deterrent to homicide . . . . Over many years, deterrence 
studies have been inconclusive, with most experts 
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 103. Id. at 801. 
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 105. See id. at 835 (“[Data] suggested that the true 95% confidence interval runs from each execution 
causing 23 homicides to each preventing 54 homicides.”). 
 106. Id. at 794; see also id. at 843 (“The only clear conclusion is that the execution policy drives little 
of the year-to-year variation in homicide rates. As to whether executions raise or lower the homicide 
rate, we remain profoundly uncertain.”). 
 107. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS 12 (2009), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf. 
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concluding that the relative rarity of executions and their 
concentrations in a few states renders national conclusions 
about a deterrent effect to the death penalty unreliable.108 
Defenders should stress to fiscal conservatives that empirical 
evidence does not support the proposition that the death penalty 
enhances public safety. And, of course, fiscal conservatives should be 
able to recognize that the death penalty imposes a major burden on 
taxpayers. 
There is no one accepted method to determine death penalty costs, 
which will vary depending upon local pay scales and other factors, 
but it is clear that those costs are high. “Researchers have employed 
different approaches, using different assumptions. However, all of 
the studies conclude that the death penalty system is far more 
expensive than an alternative system in which the maximum sentence 
is life in prison.”109 
The DPIC concludes, however, that the true cost for the death 
penalty must not be calculated for a case where an execution occurs, 
but for the total of all death penalty cases. DPIC notes that a state 
may spend $1 million more for a death penalty trial than for a non-
death proceeding for the same crime. However, if only one in three of 
these trials results in a death sentence, the one death sentence resulted 
from $3 million of excess litigation costs. And if only one in ten 
sentenced to death is actually executed, each execution results from 
$30 million in excess costs.110 
A fiscally conservative response might contend that death penalty 
costs can be reduced. Surely a common thought is that the 
expenditures are primarily driven by extensive appeal and post-
sentencing proceedings. Many may think that streamlining the post-
sentencing proceedings will reduce the taxpayers’ burden. It is here 
that defenders can be especially useful by explaining why the death 
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penalty costs so much. The primary generators of excess expenses 
are the trials, not the post-sentencing proceedings. A North Carolina 
study found, for example, that the trials cost four times as much as 
the appeals process.111 Stripping away appellate and post-conviction 
rights and remedies will have little overall effect on death penalty 
costs because the trial expenses will remain. 
Defenders should explain the many reasons why a death penalty 
trial is so much more costly than a non-death penalty proceeding for 
the same crime. Jury selection will take much longer in the capital 
case. “Each person’s position on the death penalty is explored in 
detail by the judge, the prosecutor and the defense attorney. Such 
questioning about the eventual punishment of the defendant would 
not be allowed in a non-death penalty case, and it makes jury 
selection take much longer in capital cases.”112 More potential jurors 
will be needed for the capital case because every juror must be “death 
qualified,” and many will not be. “Potential jurors must be carefully 
questioned about their willingness to vote for the death penalty or life 
imprisonment; any prospective juror who cannot fairly consider both 
sentencing alternatives is excluded from serving.”113 
The guilt phase in a capital murder trial after the jury is selected 
should not raise different issues from the non-capital case, and we 
can hope that the lawyers prepare and try each meticulously. The 
death penalty attorneys, however, have to make special preparations 
for a possible sentencing phase. If the defendant is found guilty, an 
additional, separate trial has to be held for the jury to pronounce 
whether the defendant should be executed, and this proceeding is 
very expensive. 
The attorneys must seek information about possible mitigating and 
aggravating factors that might be presented to the jury. Mitigating 
factors can come from any part of a defendant’s life, and, therefore, 
every part of the defendant’s existence from birth to the present must 
be probed. As a result, it is common for at least two prosecutors and 
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two defense attorneys to be assigned to the case so that attorneys can 
fully explore and prepare for the guilt and penalty phase. And in 
addition, a well-defended case usually requires the assistance of an 
expert in mitigation in addition to the attorneys. 
The mitigation phase inevitably leads to the presentation of 
evidence that was not admissible during the guilt phase. The defense, 
for example, may contend that the defendant was abused as a child 
and that this abuse is a mitigating factor. Evidence for this 
contention, which may have occurred decades earlier, may take great 
effort to unearth. If the defense presents such evidence, the 
prosecution, of course, can contest it, and the prosecution has to 
spend comparable efforts in exploring the issue. Even if an insanity 
defense was not presented at trial, mental illness at any point in the 
defendant’s life might be presented as mitigation. This can require 
the presentation of psychiatric and psychological experts by both 
sides who were not presented at the guilt phase. The defense may 
claim mitigation because of a defendant’s military service, and both 
sides will have to probe military records. The possibilities for 
mitigation are legion and can take much work to develop. 
The prosecution can present evidence about aggravating factors 
that was not presented at the guilt phase. The prosecution may 
contend that death is warranted because of other depredations 
committed by the defendant. The defense in response may contest the 
prosecution’s depictions, and that, in essence, can lead to separate 
mini-trials. In some states, the prosecution may present evidence of 
the future dangerousness of the defendant, and this can bring another 
round of psychiatric and psychological evidence requiring more 
experts, who must be paid not only for their court time but also for 
their preparation. And if the defendant is mentally retarded, he cannot 
be executed without another round of experts and ensuing costs. 
In effect, a complete biography of the defendant needs to be 
prepared by both the prosecution and defense, and the biographical 
compilation takes much time and money. Relatives, teachers, co-
workers, supervisors, friends, acquaintances, doctors, and others who 
have encountered the defendant from all parts of his life need to be 
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found and interviewed and, if they have useful information for the 
penalty phase, prepared for trial and brought to court. Since the 
penalty-phase evidence is presented to the same jury that decided 
guilt, the penalty phase is usually held shortly after the verdict on 
guilt is announced. This means that the work on the penalty phase 
has to be done before the guilt phase, and it has to be done even if the 
work turns out not to be necessary because the jury returns a not-
guilty verdict to all death penalty counts. 
Defenders should point out to fiscal conservatives that the costs of 
a capital trial can be especially devastating to a locality. In many 
places, the trial process is funded primarily by the local community, 
not the state. “An article in the Wall Street Journal noted that in 
states where counties are chiefly responsible for prosecuting capital 
cases, the expenses can put an extraordinary burden on local budgets 
comparable to that caused by a natural disaster.”114 
While capital trials are enormously expensive, the death penalty 
increases budgets in ways other than through litigation. For example, 
those held under a sentence of death are generally imprisoned 
separately from the general prison population with increased security, 
and this costs extra: 
In California, a legislative commission concluded that it 
costs the state an extra $90,000 for each death row inmate 
per year compared to the costs of the same inmate housed 
in general population. With over 670 inmates on death row, 
that amounts to an additional yearly cost of $60 million 
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JOHN GRISHAM, THE CONFESSION 108–10 (Dell Mass Market Ed. 2011) (2010). 
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solely attributable to the death penalty.115 
When all the expenses are calculated, each death penalty 
proceeding imposes a huge burden on taxpayers. A 2000 estimate 
concluded that Florida spends $54 million a year over what it would 
spend to punish all first-degree murderers with life in prison without 
parole.116 
Fiscal conservatives should see that the death penalty does not 
demonstrably benefit societal safety. On the other hand, the death 
penalty greatly burdens taxpayers. The result of such a cost-benefit 
analysis is clear. Defenders should be presenting this information to 
fiscal conservatives seeking to get them to join in the movement for 
abolishing the death penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
Our present economic crisis will harm those who defend indigents. 
The chronic underfunding of public defenders can only be expected 
to get worse. On the other hand, that economic crisis provides an 
opportunity for meaningful criminal justice reform. Fiscal 
conservatives have realized that many tough-on-crime policies have 
not aided public safety, but have increased taxpayers’ burdens. Such 
conservatives are proposing some sensible reforms. Defenders should 
recognize that fiscal conservatives may be the most likely to get such 
changes enacted. Defenders should seek to aid the fiscal 
conservatives on proposals those conservatives have made. 
Defenders, however, should use their experience to identify other 
reforms that the fiscal conservatives have not recognized, 
concentrating on areas of criminal justice that do not enhance societal 
safety while increasing the taxes that have to be paid. 
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